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ABSTRACT
Nonlinear Pricing Strategies and Market Concentration
in the Airline Industry. (August 2009)
Manuel A. Hernandez Garcia, B.A., Universidad del Pacifico, Peru
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Steven N. Wiggins
This dissertation investigates the effect of market concentration on nonlinear
pricing strategies in the airline industry. The study develops a theoretical nonlinear
pricing model with both discrete product and consumer types to derive testable im-
plications about the impact of market concentration on the structure of relative prices
within a menu of prices. The analysis then uses a unique, airline ticket level data
set to test the model predictions. The data set consists of a representative sample
of airline tickets purchased between June and December 2004 from one major Com-
puter Reservation System (CRS), for travel in the fourth quarter of the same year.
The study restricts attention to 246 domestic routes in the United States, resulting
in 878,169 tickets. This unique data set allows us to examine the effect of market
structure conditions on relative prices within a menu of fare types with restrictive
ticket characteristics. The analysis also contributes to the understanding of how the
level of competition in a market affects the dispersion of airline prices.
The results indicate that market concentration differentially impacts high versus
low priced fares, as predicted by the theoretical model. More specifically, there is a
decrease in the ratio of high- to low-quality fares as markets become more concen-
trated, after controlling for numerous factors that may affect prices through costs and
market characteristics. The ratio of medium- to low-quality fares, however, increases
with less competition. From a welfare perspective, it is interesting to observe that not
all travelers are affected in the same way by a decrease in the level of competition.
iv
Business travelers, who purchase high priced fares, end up paying relatively lower
prices in more concentrated markets while leisure travelers pay more.
vTo my father
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and Objectives
This dissertation examines the impact of market concentration on nonlinear pricing
strategies in the airline industry. In a context where firms offer a menu of prices,
market structure conditions are likely to affect both the level of prices and the struc-
ture of relative prices within the price schedule. This study uses a unique, airline
ticket level data set to investigate this issue by examining the effect of concentration
on relative prices within a menu of fare types with restrictive ticket characteristics.
The analysis also contributes to the understanding of how market concentration
affects the dispersion of airline prices. Borenstein and Rose (1994) show that airlines
offer highly dispersed prices, in particular, that the expected absolute difference in
prices between two passengers on the same airline and route is 36 percent of the aver-
age price. They also find that price dispersion decreases with market concentration.
The authors argue that the dispersion observed in airline prices may arise either from
variation in costs or from discriminatory pricing. This dissertation focuses on nonlin-
ear pricing, a particular form of price discrimination that has received little attention
in the airline literature probably due to data limitations. The study analyzes the
relationship between concentration and the structure of relative prices within a fare
menu while controlling for numerous factors that may affect prices through costs and
market characteristics.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study in the airline industry to
examine the impact of market concentration on relative prices within a menu of fare
The journal model is The Review of Economics and Statistics.
2types and ticket restrictions. Borenstein (1989) finds that low-end fares increase
with market concentration while high-end fares decrease, but the analysis does not
explicitly account for ticket-specific factors such as ticket characteristics (restrictions)
and time of purchase. Stavins (2001) uses marginal implicit prices of ticket restrictions
as a proxy for price discrimination and concludes that price discrimination decreases
with concentration. The study, however, only focuses on two ticket restrictions and on
a limited number of routes. This dissertation is more in line with Busse and Rysman
(2005) who examine the relationship between competition and price-size schedules
offered for display advertising in Yellow Pages directories.
Since the pioneer work of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984)
on monopolistic nonlinear pricing, there has been a growing theoretical literature ex-
tending the analysis to competitive environments. Stole (2007) provides an extensive
survey of models on nonlinear pricing and imperfect competition. These models as-
sume that firms compete via a collection of quality-price pairs. Consumers self-select
choosing both the firm and a particular quality-price pair.
A caveat of the models with continuous product and consumer types is that they
fail to provide clear predictions regarding the relationship between nonlinear pricing
strategies and market concentration. Busse and Rysman (2002) correctly point out
that two of the most recent theoretical contributions, Stole (1995) and Rochet and
Stole (2002), make differing predictions about the effect of competition on prices
within a price schedule.
In contrast, models with both discrete product and consumer types provide a
better framework to explicitly examine the effect of competition on relative prices.
Two-type models, as in Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) and Liu and Serfes
(2006), allow us to derive testable predictions about the impact of market concen-
tration on relative prices of high- and low-quality products. This study develops a
3similar discrete-type model to derive and test implications for airline pricing.
The airline industry provides an ideal framework for studying the relationship
between nonlinear pricing strategies and market structure. Airlines charge different
fares to different customers by grouping wide-ranging fares with restrictive ticket
characteristics so that travelers self-select and purchase these different tickets.1 In
addition these menus of fare types and ticket restrictions are similar across routes,
even when routes have different levels of competition. Some routes are mainly served
by one carrier while others are served by many. Yet the basic fare structure is highly
similar. This feature allows us to compare the pricing of a standard set of ticket
options across different competitive settings.
The study is made possible because the unique data set enables us to separate
tickets into broad quality groups. Specifically, fares are grouped into four quality
categories according to cabin class, refundability, and travel and stay restrictions.
The lowest quality group is then set as the base group to examine if there are any
systematic variations in the relative prices of the different fare types across markets
with different levels of concentration. The analysis includes several controls at the
ticket, flight and market level that may affect airline fares.
The results indicate that market concentration differentially impacts high versus
low priced fares, as predicted by the theoretical model. More specifically, there is a
decrease in the ratio of high fares to low fares as concentration increases. The ratio
of medium fares to low fares, however, increases with less competition. Overall, the
observed relative pricing pattern is consistent with the negative relationship between
market concentration and price dispersion found in Borenstein and Rose (1994). This
1On this matter, Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins (2007) find evidence that theories
in which ticket characteristics segment customers and facilitate price discrimination
may play a major role in airline pricing. Sengupta and Wiggins (2006) also reveal
that ticket characteristics explain much of the variation in airline fares.
4dissertation contributes to this analysis by describing the effect of concentration on
the structure of relative prices within a fare menu.
From a welfare perspective, the results suggest that not all travelers are affected
in the same way by a decrease in the level of competition. Business travelers, who pur-
chase high priced tickets and are generally more brand-loyal, end up paying relatively
lower fares in less competitive markets while leisure travelers pay more.
B. Scope
The body of this dissertation contains five chapters. Chapter II provides a brief
overview of the literature on nonlinear pricing and imperfect competition. The chap-
ter also develops a discrete-type model with testable implications. The baseline model
is a two-type model with two firms offering two products, differentiated by quality,
and two consumer types. The model is also extended in two directions.
Chapter III describes the data set on airline ticket transactions as well as the
various market level data used in the analysis. An explanation of how wide-ranging
fares with restrictive characteristics are separated into broad quality groups is also
provided. This grouping of airline fares is essential to test the predictions of the
theoretical model in the next chapter. The chapter ends with a preliminary analysis
of the data.
Chapter IV discusses the empirical strategy, the model specification and the
estimation results. More specifically, the chapter addresses the importance of carrying
out a regression analysis to control for several cost and market-specific factors that
may affect airline prices, and examine the effect of market concentration on relative
prices within a menu of fare types and ticket restrictions. Two log-linear fare equations
are estimated, a no-interaction model and an interaction model. In the no-interaction
5model, the relative premia of the different ticket group fares are assumed to not
vary with market structure while in the interaction model the relative premia are
allowed to vary with market structure. Further, separate estimations by main carrier
are performed to examine whether these carriers follow a similar nonlinear pricing
strategy when they face less competition. Finally, an alternative semiparametric
model is estimated to check the robustness of the results. Chapter V presents the
conclusions of the dissertation.
6CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter provides a brief overview of the models on nonlinear pricing and imper-
fect competition. Next, a model with both discrete product and consumer types is
developed to derive testable implications about the impact of market concentration
on relative prices within a menu of quality-price pairs. The baseline model is a two-
type model with two firms offering two products, differentiated by quality, and two
consumer types. The model is then extended in two directions.
A. Models on Nonlinear Pricing and Imperfect Competition
The growing literature on nonlinear pricing provides an excellent framework for an-
alyzing price discrimination strategies in varied settings. Since the seminal work of
Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984) on nonlinear pricing under
monopoly, there has been an increasing number of studies that extend the analysis
to settings where several firms compete (e.g. Stole, 1995; Villas-Boas and Schmidt-
Mohr, 1999; Armstrong and Vickers, 2001; Rochet and Stole, 2002; Johnson and
Myatt, 2003; Liu and Serfes, 2006; and Yang and Ye, 2008). This work has also
found increasing empirical applications, for example, Miravete and Ro¨ller (2004),
Seim and Viard (2004) and Miravete (2009) in mobile phones, Busse and Rysman
(2005) in Yellow Pages advertising, and McManus (2007) in specialty coffee.
The models on nonlinear pricing and imperfect competition typically consider
two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity, one vertical and one horizontal. The ver-
tical dimension captures different marginal preferences for quality while the horizontal
7dimension captures the intensity of brand preferences.1 Firms do not observe con-
sumer preferences and compete by offering a menu of quality-price (quantity-price)
pairs. Based on their preferences, individuals choose both the firm and a particular
quality-price pair. These quality-based models of price discrimination rely on self-
selection constraints where consumers choose the combination that better matches
their preferences.2
One source of controversy of the general models with continuous product and
consumer types is the effect of market structure on prices within a price schedule.
Most of these models focus on the variety of products offered and the efficiency
consequences of competition, but yield differing predictions regarding the impact of
competition on prices. As pointed by Busse and Rysman (2002), two of the most
recent theoretical contributions in nonlinear pricing, Stole (1995) and Rochet and
Stole (2002), make opposite predictions about how competition affects the structure
of relative prices within a price schedule.
In the model of Stole (1995), competition reduces prices at the bottom of the price
schedule proportionally more than at the top since consumers with a higher marginal
valuation for quality are more brand-loyal, and the price reductions necessary to
attract them to their less preferred brand are too high. Conversely, in the model of
Rochet and Stole (2002), competition reduces prices at the top of the price schedule
proportionally more than at the bottom since consumers with a higher marginal
valuation for quality enjoy more information rents or net surplus and are best able to
1To overcome technical difficulties, most models focus on one dimension (vertical or
horizontal), perform numerical simulations in case there is not a closed-form solution,
or impose further restrictions on preferences to avoid multidimensional settings (Stole,
2007).
2Firms maximize profits subject to incentive compatibility and participation
constraints.
8seek out substitutes.3 More recently, Yang and Ye (2008) extend Rochet and Stole’s
(2002) model by relaxing the assumption of full-market coverage, but do not provide
predictions about the effect of competition on relative prices.4
Models with both discrete product and consumer types provide a better frame-
work to explicitly examine the impact of competition on relative prices. As in Villas-
Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) and Liu and Serfes (2006), this study develops a
two-type model with two firms offering two products, differentiated by quality, and
two consumer types. This model yields closed-form solutions and enable us to per-
form comparative static analysis, while maintaining a fixed number of product types.
The model is also extended in two directions, as discussed later.
B. A Testable Model
The model builds on the models developed by Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999)
and Liu and Serfes (2006).5 Different assumptions are made that allow us to solve the
model as a two-stage non-cooperative game and look for a subgame-perfect symmetric
equilibrium, as in Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005).
Consider two firms located at the end points of a unit-length interval. Firm 1
is located at zero and Firm 2 is located at one. The firms each offer two products
3Stole (1995) develops a model of horizontal preference uncertainty with a positive
correlation between the intensity of brand preferences and the marginal valuation for
quality. Rochet and Stole (2002), in turn, develop a model of horizontal and vertical
preference uncertainty where both dimensions are uncorrelated.
4These authors show that competition has a larger negative effect on prices in
the higher end of the quality range. However, more competition also increases the
coverage of individuals with a lower marginal valuation for quality, which end up
paying lower prices for products in the lower end of the quality range.
5Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) analyze the effect of horizontal differentia-
tion (intensity of competition) on loan-granting practices while Liu and Serfes (2006)
evaluate the relationship between the degree of competition and the Gini coefficient
in the airline industry.
9differentiated by quality, a low-quality product qL at price pL and a high-quality
product qH at price pH . Both firms have the same technology and costs. To produce
a unit of quality q a firm incurs in cost cq (c ≥ 0). There are also fixed costs of
producing good of quality q equal to q2/2.6
Consumer preferences differ regarding both quality and location. These prefer-
ences are unobservable and noncontractable. An individual who purchases product
(q, p) from Firm 1 enjoys utility U(θ, q, p, d) = v + θq − p − td2, where v > 0 is the
reservation utility obtained from making a purchase, θ is the marginal preference for
quality, t are per-unit transportation costs, and d is the distance to Firm 1 (horizontal
location).7 The marginal preference for quality or vertical type θ and the horizontal
location d are independent. Conversely, an individual who purchases product (q, p)
from Firm 2, enjoys utility U(θ, q, p, d) = v + θq − p− t(1 − d)2. These utility func-
tions imply that firms are only able to sort consumers with respect to their marginal
preference for quality.8
In the airline context, the quality or vertical dimension captures different marginal
preferences over ticket characteristics (restrictions) while the location or horizon-
tal dimension captures different preferences over carriers (or departure times). The
marginal disutility of flying in a particular airline or departure time, which is not the
consumer’s preferred one, is then increasing in the difference (distance) between the
two.
Assume two consumer types in the vertical dimension, a fraction λ with a low
6The quadratic functional form assumed is not crucial. A convex cost function is
sufficient to solve the model.
7The assumption that transportation costs are quadratic in distance is standard
for these models. In this study, the model yields similar predictions under both linear
and quadratic transportation costs.
8Refer to Appendix A for further details about the model.
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marginal preference for quality denoted by θL (hereafter low-type consumers), and a
fraction 1 − λ of individuals with a high marginal preference for quality denoted by
θH (hereafter high-type consumers), where θH > θL. Low-type consumers could be
regarded as leisure travelers while high-type consumers as business travelers. Each
consumer type is uniformly distributed over the unit-length interval with a unit mass.
Further assume that the reservation utility v is sufficiently high so that the whole
market is covered.9
Firm i’s, i = 1, 2, decision problem consists of offering quality-price pairs (qiL, piL)
and (qiH , piH) that maximize profits subject to incentive-compatibility (IC) and par-
ticipation constraints, given the other firm’s quality-price pairs. Formally,
Max
piL,piH ,qiL,qiH
pii = λ[(piL − cqiL)xiL]− q
2
iL
2
+ (1− λ)[(piH − cqiH)xiH ]− q
2
iH
2
s.t.
θHqiH − piH ≥ θHqiL − piL, (ICH)
θLqiL − piL ≥ θLqiH − piH , (ICL)
qiL, qiH , piL, piH > 0,
where xiL and xiH are the demands for Firm i’s low- and high-quality products,
respectively. The IC constraints, (ICH) and (ICL), imply that truth telling is a domi-
nant strategy for all customers. It can be shown that Firm 1’s demand functions are
given by,
x1L = dL =
t+ θL(q1L − q2L)− (p1L − p2L)
2t
, (2.1)
9This is equivalent to the full-scale competition case in Villas-Boas and Schmidt-
Mohr (1999).
11
x1H = dH =
t+ θH(q1H − q2H)− (p1H − p2H)
2t
. (2.2)
The participation constraint regarding competition for customers with the other
firm is already embedded in the demand functions. The second participation con-
straint is the standard individual-rationality (IR) constraint, which is assumed slack
for all consumers due to the full-market coverage assumption.
It is further assumed that the difference in quality between the high- and low-
type product is a fixed proportion. Let qiH = δqiL, i = 1, 2, where δ > 1. This
assumption allows us to solve the model as a two-stage non-cooperative game and
derive a subgame-perfect symmetric equilibrium where (ICH) binds and (ICL) does
not.10 In the first stage firms set quality while in the second stage they compete in
prices. The details of the derivations are presented in Appendix A.
Following Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) and Yang and Ye (2008), the
degree of horizontal differentiation, captured by the per-unit transportation cost t,
serves as an index for the level of competition among firms. A decrease in t is equiv-
alent to an increase in the intensity of competition. In the extreme case of t=0, the
horizontal dimension becomes irrelevant and the model reduces to a perfectly com-
petitive market.11 In the airline context, a lower t implies that travelers will view
alternative carriers (flights) as closer substitutes. More competitive routes usually
exhibit a higher flight density than less competitive ones, and competing firms sched-
ule flights at closer departure times between one another. In the sample of routes
used later in the analysis, the average difference in departure times between flights
10This further assumption is plausible in the airline industry since the quality ratio
between high- and low-type fares could well be fixed across routes.
11Yang and Ye (2008) indicate that an increase in the number of firms (brands) in
a circular brand-preference dimension is equivalent to a decrease in t with only two
firms.
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among highly concentrated routes more than doubles the average difference among
less concentrated routes.
Figure 1 shows the impact of competition, measured through t, on the optimal
price ratio p∗H/p
∗
L. Relative prices increase with competition (lower t) or, conversely,
decrease with concentration (higher t). More specifically, the prices of both the low-
and high-quality product decrease with more competition, but the price of the former
decreases proportionally more than the price of the latter. It follows that firms
compete more fiercely for low-type consumers when they face more competition.12
This baseline model is also extended in two directions:13
Extension 1 : Each firm offers three product qualities (high, medium and low) to
three consumer types (high, medium and low marginal preference for quality). Each
consumer type is uniformly distributed over the unit-length interval. Per-unit trans-
portation costs remain equal to t. The idea is to examine the impact of competition
on relative prices within a wider range of product qualities, considering that airline
tickets are later grouped into several quality categories.
Extension 2 : Each firm offers two product qualities to two consumers types,
as in the baseline model, but per-unit transportation costs differ across individuals.
Following Liu and Serfes (2006), let tH > tL. High-type consumers are less likely to
switch firms than low-type consumers or it is more costly for them to move away from
their preferred carrier or departure time (Stole, 1995).
Figure 2 presents the effect of concentration on relative prices under the first
12The decrease in absolute prices with a lower t is consistent with the lower market
power enjoyed by firms. The purchase of the high-quality product, in turn, must
leave a higher net surplus to high-type consumers because they can also purchase the
low-quality product. With increased competition, firms worry less about providing
additional informational rents to high-type consumers because they already enjoy a
higher net surplus with a lower t.
13For more details refer to Appendix A.
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model extension with three product qualities and three consumer types. The price
ratio of both the high- and medium- to low-quality product decreases with market
concentration. The price ratio of the high- to low-quality product, however, decreases
proportionally more than the price ratio of the medium- to low-quality product with
an increase in t. Firms compete more fiercely for low-type consumers and, to a lower
extent, for medium-type consumers when they face more competition.14
Figure 3 shows how the optimal price ratio will vary with concentration under
the second model extension with two product qualities and two consumer types but
tH > tL. In this case, variations in the level of competition are measured through
changes in tL and tH . An increase in tL is equivalent to a decrease in the level of
competition for low-type consumers while an increase in tH indicates a decrease in the
level of competition for high-type consumers. Relative prices decrease with market
concentration, but this inverse relationship is more pronounced with changes in the
level of competition for low-type consumers, which are also more likely to switch
firms.15
To summarize, the following testable implications can be derived. First, the
price ratio of high- to low-quality products decreases with market concentration. The
inverse relationship between relative prices and concentration is more pronounced
when low-type individuals are less reluctant to switch firms. This seems reasonable
in the airline industry, provided that low-type travelers are generally less brand-loyal
14Firms need to worry less about medium- than low-type consumers with increased
competition because the former will enjoy of higher information rents with a lower
t. High-type consumers will enjoy of even higher information rents with increased
competition.
15Although not reported, absolute prices decrease with either a decrease in tL or tH .
This is explained by the incentive compatibility constraints that restrict consumers
to select the product type designed for them. A decrease in tL, for example, decreases
both pL and pH (in a lower extent), to prevent high-type consumers from buying the
low-quality product.
14
and more price sensitive than high-type travelers. Second, the price ratio of medium-
to low-quality products decreases with less competition, but to a lower extent than
the price ratio of high- to low-quality products.16
The following chapters describe the data used in the analysis and empirically
examine the relationship between market concentration and relative prices in the
context of a menu of airline fares. The goal is to test the model predictions derived
in this chapter and analyze whether market structure conditions affect a carrier’s
nonlinear pricing strategy.
16Note that these predictions imply a negative correlation between price dispersion
and market concentration, predicted in other related models under a different theoret-
ical framework, e.g. Borenstein (1985), Holmes (1989) and Gale (1993). Borenstein
(1985) and Holmes (1989) work under a monopolistic competition setup where firms
primarily sort customers based on the strength of their brand preferences. It is shown
that firms will compete more fiercely for customers who are less brand loyal (prob-
ably low-type individuals in the present model) when they face more competition.
Gale (1993) develops a two-period airline model with price discrimination. Tickets
are initially homogenous and become horizontally differentiated just prior to flight
departure. The author shows that firms will compete more fiercely for consumers
who are less time-sensitive (probably low-type individuals in the present model) with
increased competition.
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CHAPTER III
DATA
The main data source of this study is a census of airline ticket transactions from
a major Computer Reservation System (CRS). The data set consists of tickets pur-
chased between June and December 2004 for travel in the fourth quarter of the same
year. It includes tickets purchased directly from airlines, including their websites,
and through travel agents and several online travel sites. Overall, the data repre-
sents around thirty percent of all domestic ticket transactions in the U.S. For each
ticket sold or itinerary, there is information on the fare paid, origin and destination,
segments (coupons) involved in the itinerary, carrier and flight number, cabin and
booking class, and dates of purchase, departure and return.
Following Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein and Rose (1994), a route is defined
as an airport-pair, regardless of direction, and itineraries other than one-way and
roundtrips are not considered. The analysis is restricted to nonstop itineraries. Tick-
ets that involve travel with different airlines (interline tickets) are also excluded.
Prices are measured as roundtrip fares, so in the case of one-way tickets the fare
is doubled. To avoid holiday peaks, transactions involving travel on Thanksgiving,
Christmas and New Years are dropped.1 The data set includes tickets for flights
operated by AirTran, Alaska, American, America West, Continental, Delta, Frontier,
Hawaiian, Midwest, Northwest, Spirit, Sun Country, ATA, United and US Airways.2
1The analysis excludes travel on the Wednesday prior to Thanksgiving until the
following Sunday, as well as travel beginning on December 22nd through the end of
year.
2The data set includes tickets from all carriers, except Southwest whom trans-
ported at least five percent of all domestic travelers during the fourth quarter of
2004. Southwest tickets are excluded because there is only limited information for
these tickets.
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Due to confidentiality reasons, the major CRS vendor did not provide information
on ticket restrictions. Consequently, the transaction data set was merged to historical
data from a travel agent’s CRS containing a large subset of ticket fares offered for
travel in the last quarter of 2004.3 For each fare listed on this second data set,
there is information on origin and destination, carrier, booking class, departure date
from origin, advance purchase requirements, refundability, travel restrictions, and
maximum or minimum stay restrictions. The matching procedure, described in Puller,
Sengupta, and Wiggins (2007), matches an itinerary from the transaction data set to a
fare from the travel agent’s data set based on route, carrier and prices. The matching
process ensured that fares matched within two percent and that the itinerary matched
advance purchase requirements and travel and stay restrictions.
The analysis restricts attention to matched itineraries where there are at least
one thousand observations per route and one hundred observations per carrier-route.
This restriction results in 878,169 tickets on 246 routes or 460 carrier-routes. The list
of routes is reported in Table 1.
Figure 4 presents kernel densities comparing the fares of the matched transactions
and the more complete, original data. The matching procedure appears to match at
a somewhat lower rate at the lower end of the fare distribution, but generally the
matched tickets are representative.
The matched data set permits us to group tickets into broad quality groups.
Specifically, tickets are grouped into four quality categories. Group F fares include
first class tickets. Group 1 fares correspond to refundable business, full coach and
coach tickets. Group 2 fares include nonrefundable tickets without travel or stay
restrictions while Group 3 fares include nonrefundable tickets with travel and/or stay
3The travel agent’s data set is incomplete because some of the posted fares are
usually deleted after a certain period of time, although not in a systematic way.
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restrictions.
Quality generally decreases as one moves from Group F through Group 3. Group
F is first class, refundable and unrestricted, Group 1 is refundable typically without
restrictions, Group 2 is nonrefundable but without restrictions, while Group 3 is
nonrefundable and carries significant travel and/or stay restrictions. Table 2 shows
the variation in mean fares by group for various carriers, which tend to confirm the
asserted price/quality differences.4 Specifically the data was calculated as deviations
from the mean fare at the carrier route level. These deviations were then averaged
across routes for individual carriers.
Overall, there is a strong correlation between the grouping of tickets and prices.
Figure 5 shows that the average fare per mile among tickets in Group F through
Group 3 is 96, 57, 26 and 17 cents, respectively. The positive correlation between the
broad quality categories and prices is recurrent across itineraries involving different
travel distances. This price/quality differences perfectly fit in the theoretical setup
where carriers are assumed to offer different quality-price combinations for consumers
to self-select.5
In addition to the transaction data, various market level data from other sources
is also used. These include route level carrier market share and market structure
measures, as well as other market level variables widely used in the literature. Table
3 details the sources of information consulted to construct these variables. Other
market level variables include hubs, slot-controlled airports, presence of Southwest
4The carriers include American, United, Delta, Continental, US Airways and
Northwest. Each of these carriers transported at least five percent of all domestic
travelers during the last quarter of 2004.
5This four-type fare structure together with dummy variables for time of purchase
and one-way travel and carrier fixed effects, explain on average 73 percent of the fare
variation in each of the routes analyzed. Details are available upon request.
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and other low cost carriers, distance, total number of flights, per capita income,
tourism index and temperature difference. Appendix B provides a full description of
all the variables used in the analysis.
In the case of the market structure measures, there is a continuous variable,
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or HHI. As an alternative measure, three categorical
variables are considered: monopoly, duopoly and competitive, which where developed
by Borenstein and Rose (1994). A route is considered a monopoly if a single carrier
transports more than 90 percent of nonstop passengers. A non-monopoly route is
considered a duopoly if two carriers cumulatively transport more than 90 percent of
nonstop passengers. All other routes are considered competitive.6
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the final data set. Roundtrip fares range
from 62 dollars for a trip Las Vegas (LAS) – Los Angeles (LAX) in American to 4,806
dollars for a trip San Francisco (SFO) – New York-Kennedy (JFK) in United. The
average fare paid is 457 dollars or 31.3 cents per mile. The fraction of tickets in
Group F through 3 is 5, 20, 28 and 47 percent, respectively. Roughly 61 percent of
the tickets are bought less than two weeks prior to departure, and 25 percent are
purchased in the last 3 days. Additionally, more than 80 percent of the itineraries
involve travel to/from a hub of the operating carrier, 74 percent of the itineraries are
for roundtrip travel, and 65 percent of the tickets involve travel during peak times.7
The distribution of tickets by market structure, reported in Table 5, indicates
that 40 percent of the itineraries in the sample correspond to competitive routes, 48
6This study uses the number of nonstop passengers on a route to calculate the
market structure measures, instead of the number of flights used by Borenstein and
Rose (1994). Previous studies have found that using either the number of passengers
or the number of flights as a basis for market concentration calculations yields similar
results (Stavins, 2001).
7Peak time is defined as Monday through Friday between 7–10am and 3–7pm.
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percent to duopoly routes, and 12 percent to monopoly routes. In terms of routes,
18 percent of them are monopolies, 48 percent are duopolies and the remaining 34
percent are competitive markets.8 A similar distribution of tickets and routes by
market structure is observed across different flying distances. On average, there
is a reasonable number of tickets per route across markets with different levels of
concentration and travel distance.
A. Preliminary Analysis
Figure 6 provides a preliminary look at the ratio of various ticket group fares and
Group 3, the lowest price tickets, under different market concentration levels. The
figure shows that the average fare per mile of Group F (First Class) decreases relative
to Group 3 as markets become more concentrated. On competitive routes the ratio
of Group F to Group 3 fares is approximately 5.9 while on monopolistic routes the
ratio is less than 4.6. In contrast, the ratio of Group 1 to Group 3 fares increases
as we move to less competitive markets, from 2.7 in competitive markets to 3.7 in
monopoly markets, while Group 2 relative fares do not seem to vary with market
structure conditions (the ratio fluctuates around 1.5). This relative pricing pattern,
moreover, holds under alternative market structure definitions (see Figure 7).9
8In Borenstein and Rose (1994), 12 percent of the 521 routes analyzed are monop-
olies, 41 percent are duopolies, and 46 percent are competitive markets. The period
of analysis is the second quarter of 1986.
9The alternative definitions include the HHI and Verlinda’s (2005) market struc-
ture categories. In the case of the HHI, routes are divided into three groups: HHI
less than or equal to 0.5, HHI between 0.5 and 0.8, and HHI greater than 0.8. In the
case of the market structure categories, a route is considered a monopoly if a carrier
transports at least 50 percent of nonstop passengers and the share of the second major
carrier is less than one ninth of the share of the first carrier. A non-monopoly route
is considered a duopoly if two carriers cumulatively transport at least 50 percent of
nonstop passengers and the share of the third major carrier is less than one ninth of
the share of the second carrier. All other routes are considered competitive.
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The decrease in the ratio of high- to low-type fares as markets become more con-
centrated, specifically the ratio of Group F to Group 3 fares, matches the predictions
of the theoretical model. In the model, as we move to less competitive markets, the
lower price ratio results from the fact that low-type fares increase proportionally more
than high-type fares. The relative increase of Group 1 fares (i.e. medium-type fares),
however, does not match the model predictions.10 Overall, the observed relative pric-
ing pattern is in line with Borenstein and Rose (1994) which find a negative effect of
market concentration on price dispersion.11
Another preliminary look at the data can be obtained by examining carrier pric-
ing on monopoly versus competitive routes matched by distance. For example, Figures
8 and 9 show United Airlines’ (UA) average relative prices, by fare type and day of
purchase, for two of the main short-distance and long-distance routes in the sam-
ple.12 Among the short-distance routes, Washington-Dulles (IAD) – Boston (BOS)
is a competitive market and San Francisco (SFO) – San Diego (SAN) a monopoly
market. Among the long-distance routes, San Francisco (SFO) – New York-Kennedy
(JFK) is a competitive route and San Francisco (SFO) – Washington-Dulles (IAD)
a monopoly route. The ratio of Group F to Group 3 fares is typically lower in the
selected monopoly routes than in the competitive ones, independent of the time of
purchase. Moreover, Group F relative fares appear to overlap with Group 1 relative
fares in monopoly markets while in competitive markets they are different.
10A possible explanation for this result is discussed later.
11Borenstein and Rose (1994) do not include first class tickets. It is interesting to
still observe a negative correlation between market concentration and price dispersion
when including a broader range of ticket types.
12Day of purchase is the number of days prior to departure that the ticket was
purchased. As discussed later, fares may vary as the purchase date approaches the
departure date due to variations in capacity utilization.
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CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
This chapter discusses the empirical strategy, the model specification and the estima-
tion results. The chapter first addresses the importance of carrying out a regression
analysis to control for several cost and market-specific factors, and examine whether
carriers modify their nonlinear pricing strategy when they face less competition. Next,
the two log-linear fare equations estimated are described, a no-interaction model and
an interaction model. The chapter then presents the estimation results, including
separate estimations by main carrier. The estimation results of an alternative semi-
parametric model are discussed at the end.
A. Empirical Strategy
As noted, the theoretical model predicts that the ratio of high- to low-quality fares
will decrease as a market becomes more concentrated. The model also predicts that
the ratio of medium- to low-quality fares will decrease with less competition, but to a
lower extent than the ratio of high- to low-quality fares. Considering that nonlinear
prices enable firms to price discriminate, the ultimate goal of this dissertation is to
examine whether market structure conditions affect a carrier’s price discrimination
strategy. This involves isolating the effect of competitive interactions on relative
prices from cost and other market-specific effects.
More specifically, Clerides (2004) argues that any price variation that cannot be
explained by cost differences is usually regarded as price discrimination. The present
study adopts this reasoning. To conclude then that nonlinear prices are discrimina-
tory and that carriers modify their price discrimination strategy when they face less
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competition, it is necessary to account for costs.1 Ideally, this requires comparing the
price-cost ratio of the different ticket groups and Group 3 across routes with different
levels of competition. Marginal costs, however, are not directly observed.
An option is to assume that the marginal cost ratio of various ticket group fares
and Group 3 do not change with market structure, as in Busse and Rysman (2005).
But the marginal cost of an airline ticket (seat) is the sum of the marginal cost of
the service, incurred only on sold tickets, plus the shadow cost of capacity, incurred
whether or not the ticket is sold (Dana, 1998). The former is, for example, the cost
of fuel and meals while the latter results from variations in capacity utilization over
time and/or changes in the perceived probability that demand will exceed capacity.
The cost ratio of the different ticket groups might be neutral to market structure if
only the marginal cost of the service is considered, but it is not necessarily neutral
if the shadow cost of capacity is included.2 The shadow cost of capacity of a ticket
depends on several factors at the ticket, flight and route level.
Another element to consider is that routes not only differ in the level of compe-
tition, but they may also differ in other market characteristics, like relative demands
for different fare types. The difference in relative demands could affect the nonlinear
pricing strategy followed by carriers, regardless of the level of competition on the
route. In Figure 8, for example, there might be a higher fraction of business travelers
1In the theoretical model firms are assumed to face a constant marginal cost, so
it is not necessary to worry about any cost effects.
2For example, assume that there is excess demand for high-quality tickets during
peak periods. Further assume that competitive routes exhibit a higher flight density
during peak periods than monopoly routes. The shadow cost of capacity of high- to
low-quality fares is then expected to change as we move to more competitive markets.
The direction of the change, however, is uncertain. As pointed by Borenstein and
Rose (1994), an increase in the number of flights is likely to lower the shadow cost of
capacity for flights facing excess demand but may raise the demand uncertainty for
any given flight.
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and a higher demand for high-quality fares, relative to low-quality fares, on the route
Washington-Dulles (IAD) – Boston (BOS) versus the route San Francisco (SFO) –
San Diego (SAN). The difference in relative prices between these routes could be
partly explained by differences in the relative demand for different fare types.
It is necessary then to isolate the effect of competitive interactions on relative
prices from cost and other market factors that may explain airline fares. A regression
analysis allows us to do so by controlling for several factors at the ticket, flight and
market level. The idea is to account for possible differences in costs, particularly
shadow costs, across fares as well as for differences in market characteristics, like
relative demands for different fare types, across routes.
B. Model Specification
The model to be estimated allows us to examine the quality premium of the different
ticket group fares over Group 3, the lowest price tickets, and whether these premia
vary with market concentration. It also allows us to control for factors that may
affect prices through costs or through market characteristics. In particular, fares are
modeled as a function of group dummies for fare type, market concentration, carrier
market share on the route and a set of controls at the ticket, flight and market level.
The key variables are the group dummies which capture the quality premia of the
different ticket group fares over Group 3.
Two log-linear fare equations are estimated. In the first equation the quality
premia are assumed to not vary with market concentration. In the second equation the
quality premia are allowed to vary with market concentration, so the group dummies
are interacted with the market concentration measures. The first equation is referred
to as the no interaction model and the second equation as the interaction model.
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The log-linear fare equation of the no interaction model is given by,
ln pijkt = β0 +
2∑
f=F
βf1qfi + β2mktstructurek + β3mktsharejk (4.1)
+Xijktλ+ α1j + κ1k + εijkt
where pijkt is the fare per mile of ticket (itinerary) i charged by carrier j on route
k at time t, qfi is a dummy variable for Group f fare, f = F, .., 2, mktstructurek is
the route market structure (measured through the HHI or categorical variables for
monopoly and duopoly), mktsharejk is the carrier market share on the route, and
Xijkt is a vector of ticket, flight and route controls. The error term is assumed to
have a carrier effect α1j, a route effect κ1k common to all carriers on a route, and a
white noise error εijkt specific to each observation.
The log-linear fare equation of the interaction model is given by,
ln pijkt = δ0 +
2∑
f=F
δf1qfi + δ2mktstructurek +
2∑
f=F
δf3(qfi ×mktstructurek) (4.2)
+ δ4mktsharejk +Xijktγ + α2j + κ2k + υijkt.
The parameters of interest are βf1 in equation (3) and δf1 and δf3 in equation (4),
where f = F, .., 2. The magnitude of the coefficients βf1 and δf1 approximates the
quality premium of Group F through Group 2 fares over Group 3. The sign of δf3
indicates how these premia vary with market concentration.
The vector of controls Xijkt is intended to account for cost and market-specific
factors, other than market structure and carrier market share, that may explain airline
pricing. The ticket-specific controls include dummy variables for number of days in
advance the ticket was purchased (0–3 days, 4–6 days, 7–13 days, and 14–21 days) and
one-way tickets. The shadow cost of a fare, for example, may vary as the purchase
date nears departure due to variations in capacity utilization.
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In addition to ticket characteristics it is also important to control for flight char-
acteristics. More specifically, the theories developed by Dana (1998, 1999a, 1999b)
and Gale and Holmes (1993) indicate that prices may vary with load factor.3 Vari-
ations in the load factor of a flight may reflect both changes in capacity utilization
and in the perceived probability that demand will exceed capacity. Accordingly, two
peaking variables are included: the average load factor at purchase of the itinerary’s
flight segments and whether the itinerary involves departure and/or return during
periods of peak travel.
The analysis also includes market-specific controls widely used in the literature.4
These market variables include a hub dummy if the carrier has a hub at the airport of
origin or destination, a dummy variable to indicate if either of the endpoint airports
is a slot-controlled airport, and a Southwest dummy and low cost dummy indicating
the presence of Southwest and other low cost carriers on the route.5 Slot-controlled
airports are supposed to raise the costs of serving a market, while the presence of
Southwest or other major low cost carriers on a route may result in significant price
reductions.
Other market-specific variables include distance, frequency of flights on the route,
average per capita income at the endpoint cities, a tourism index, and the absolute
temperature difference between the origin and destination.6 The latter two variables
3These theories argue that airline pricing can be explained in a context of costly
capacity, perishable goods and demand uncertainty.
4See Borenstein (1989), Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller (1992), Borenstein and Rose
(1994), Stavins (2001) and Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005).
5Slot-controlled airports include Washington-National (DCA), New York-Kennedy
(JFK) and New York-La Guardia (LGA). A five percent market share threshold is
used to account for the presence of Southwest or other low-cost carriers on a route,
as in Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005).
6The tourism index is the fraction of accommodation to personal income at the
destination city.
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are intended to control for tourist effects and, potentially, for differences in the relative
demand for different fare types. The tourism index is a proxy of the proportion of
leisure travelers to each destination (Borenstein, 1989; Borenstein and Rose, 1994).
A larger absolute temperature difference between the origin and destination might
also indicate a higher proportion of leisure travelers on the route (Brueckner, Dyer,
and Spiller, 1992; Stavins, 2001).
In sum, the set of variables at the ticket, flight and market level allows us to
control more accurately for costs and market factors that may explain airline pricing.
The idea is to isolate the effect of market concentration on the quality premium of the
different ticket group fares. Any variation of these premia will suggest that carriers
modify their price discrimination strategy when they face less competition.
C. Estimation Results
1. Least-Squares Estimations
The fare equations specified in (3) and (4) are estimated by both ordinary (OLS) and
two-stage least squares (2SLS). Carrier effects are treated as fixed and route effects
as random.7 The 2SLS approach is required to address the potential endogeneity
of the carrier market share and route HHI. The analysis uses the same instruments
as Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein and Rose (1994). A carrier’s market share is
endogenous because it is a function of the price it charges and is instrumented using
the carrier enplanement share at the two endpoint airports. To the extent that market
share is endogenous, the route HHI is also endogenous since the square of market share
is one component of the HHI. The HHI is instrumented with the square of the fitted
7Route effects are treated as random in order to include route-specific variables,
like market structure measures, in the estimations.
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value of market share (from its first regression) plus the rescaled sum of the square
of all other carriers’ shares on the route.8
Table 6 presents the results of estimating fare equation (3), the no interaction
model.9 These regressions examine the quality premium of Group F through Group
2 fares, over Group 3, using several ticket-, flight- and market-specific controls. In
Model 1 market concentration is measured using the HHI while in Model 2 three
categorical variables are used: monopoly, duopoly and competitive, where the latter
category is left out.
The estimation results confirm the asserted price/quality differences of the dif-
ferent ticket group fares, after controlling for cost and market-specific factors. The
quality premium over Group 3 fares declines progressively as we move from Group F
through Group 2. In the first model, where the HHI is used as the measure of market
concentration, the 2SLS results indicate that Group F through Group 2 fares per mile
are, on average, 168, 67 and 31 percent higher than Group 3 fares, respectively. In the
second model, where categorical variables are used to measure market concentration,
the corresponding premia are 169, 65 and 31 percent.
The coefficients of the control variables generally have the expected signs and
are statistically significant in both models. For clarity of exposition, the estimation
results of the second model are described next. The results show that both the time of
purchase and one-way tickets have an important effect on ticket prices. Tickets bought
closer to departure time are typically more expensive than those bought several days
in advance. More specifically, travelers who purchase a ticket 0–6 days in advance
8Refer to Appendix B for further discussion on these instruments. The total
number of flights on a route is also instrumented using the average population at the
two endpoint cities.
9For ease of presentation, estimates of the carrier fixed effects are omitted. The
standard errors reported are robust, clustered on the origin city.
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end up paying between 13 and 16 percent more per mile than those who purchase a
ticket over 21 days in advance. One-way tickets are 16 percent more expensive than
half the price of roundtrip fares.
The results also indicate that the flight or peaking variables are statistically sig-
nificant, but their economic magnitudes are small. A one standard deviation increase
in the average load factor at the time of ticket purchase (0.29) only increases fares
per mile by four percent. Tickets that involve travel during peak times of day are
approximately three percent more expensive than those during off-peak times.
Most of the coefficients of the market variables are consistent with the literature.
The results show that fares per mile on routes where the operating carrier has a hub
at either or both endpoint airports are 45 percent higher than fares on routes not
involving a carrier’s hub. The presence of a slot-controlled airport increases average
fares by about 19 percent. In routes where low-cost carriers, other than Southwest,
are present fares per mile are 11 percent lower than in other routes, while in routes
where Southwest is present fares are 38 percent lower. Distance between endpoints
and flight frequency on the route decrease the average fare per mile while a higher
per capita income at the endpoint cities increases fares. The results also reveal that
the average fare per mile decreases with market concentration, as found in previous
studies of airline pricing.10 The carrier market share on the route, however, does not
result significant.
Regarding the tourist effect variables, which are a proxy of the proportion of
leisure travelers on a route, only the tourism index is statistically significant but
economically small. A one standard deviation increase in the tourism index (0.03)
results in a four percent decrease in the average fare per mile.
10See Borenstein (1989) and Stavins (2001).
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Turning to whether the quality premium of the different ticket group fares (over
Group 3) vary with market concentration, Table 7 presents the estimation results for
equation (4), the interaction model.11 As noted, in addition to the variables used
in equation (3), this model includes the interactions of the group dummies with the
market concentration measures. In Model 1 the group dummies are interacted with
the HHI while in Model 2 they are interacted with categorical variables for monopoly
and duopoly. Note that the estimated coefficients of the control variables in both
models are very similar to those in Table 6.
The 2SLS results using the HHI as the measure of concentration (Model 1) show a
statistically significant but moderate decrease in the premium of Group F over Group
3 fares as markets become more concentrated. The results also show an increase in the
premium of Group 1 over Group 3 fares as markets become less competitive while the
relative premium of Group 2 fares does not seem to vary with market concentration.
In the upper section of Table 8 the quality premium of the different fare groups, over
Group 3, are reported at various percentile levels of HHI. The estimated Group F
relative premium decreases from 174 percent at the 10th percentile of HHI (0.34) to
158 percent at the 90th percentile of HHI (0.89). The estimated Group 1 relative
premium increases from 50 to 88 percent at the corresponding percentile levels of
HHI.
The estimation results using categorical variables as measures of market concen-
tration (Model 2) also indicate a decrease in the relative premium of Group F fares
as markets become less competitive. From the lower section of Table 8, the Group F
relative premium decreases by 42 percentage points as we move from competitive to
monopoly markets (from 171 to 129 percent). The relative premium of Group 1 fares
11The estimates of the carrier fixed effects are also omitted and the standard errors
reported are robust, clustered on the origin city.
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exhibits, in turn, an increase of 47 percentage points from competitive to monopoly
markets (from 54 to 101 percent) while the relative premium of Group 2 fares appears
to not vary with market structure conditions. The variations in the relative premia
with market concentration are very similar to the observed variation in relative prices
in the preliminary analysis (see Figure 6).
To summarize, the regression analysis reported in Tables 6–8 provides two im-
portant results. First, controlling for cost and market-specific factors, the quality
premium over Group 3 fares declines progressively as we move from Group F (First
Class) through Group 2. This result confirms the asserted price/quality differences of
the ticket groups. Second, the quality premium of high- to low-type fares decreases
as markets become more concentrated, specifically the relative premium of Group F
fares which also matches the predictions of the theoretical model. The relative pre-
mium of Group 1 fares or medium-type fares, however, increases as markets become
less competitive. Overall, the results suggest that carriers modify their price discrim-
ination strategy when they face less competition, at least some of them as discussed
later.
A possible explanation for the relative increase of medium-type fares as markets
become more concentrated, which the theoretical model fails to predict, is that carriers
might be following a complementary strategy when they face less competition. More
specifically, the relative increase of medium priced fares together with the relative
decrease of high priced fares suggest that carriers could be inducing travelers to
purchase tickets of higher quality. Although not reported, certain carriers show a
higher fraction of high-quality tickets sold in monopoly routes, relative to competitive
routes, together with a lower fraction of medium-quality tickets sold. The analysis of
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this complementary strategy is beyond the scope of the present study.12
2. Estimations by Carrier
Separate estimations for each major carrier were also performed to examine whether
the changes in the quality premia of the different ticket group fares with market
concentration, are recurrent across carriers. The major carriers include American,
United, Delta, Continental, US Airways and Northwest.13 The 2SLS results of esti-
mating equation (4), the interaction model, for each of these carriers are shown in
Table 9. As noted, in Model 1 market concentration is measured using the HHI while
in Model 2 categorical variables are used.
The estimation results, particularly under the second model specification, indi-
cate that carriers behave differently when they face less competition. Delta, United
and American, in a minor extent, show a decrease in the premium of Group F fares,
relative to Group 3, as markets become more concentrated. In the case of Delta, the
premium of Group F tickets decreases from 173 percent in competitive markets to 111
percent in monopoly markets. In the case of United, the corresponding premium de-
creases from 182 to 123 percent while in the case of American the premium decreases
from 144 to 120 percent.
Of these three carriers, only American shows at the same time a statistically and
economically significant increase in the relative premium of Group 1 fares as markets
become less competitive. The premium increases from 30 percent in competitive
12Theoretically, the analysis of this complementary strategy requires to modify
the current setup where consumers are assumed to buy the product type designed
for them. Empirically, the analysis implies a joint estimation of price and quantity
shares of the different fare groups.
13Each of these carriers transported at least five percent of all domestic travelers
during the fourth quarter of 2004.
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markets to 110 percent in monopoly markets. In contrast, United and Delta exhibit
a moderate increase in the relative premium of Group 2 fares.
Regarding the other airlines, both US Airways and Northwest show an important
increase in the relative premium of Group 1 fares from competitive to monopoly
markets, but the relative premium of Group F fares does not decrease with market
concentration. The premium of Group 1 fares increases from 40 to 106 percent in the
case of US Airways and from 58 to 106 percent in the case of Northwest. Continental,
in turn, does not seem to vary the relative premia of the different ticket group fares
with market structure.
D. Alternative Estimation
In this section, an alternative partially linear smooth coefficient regression is per-
formed to check the robustness of the results. This semiparametric estimation method
allows us to model the quality premium of Group F through Group 2 fares, over Group
3, as a function of HHI without imposing any functional form on the relationship be-
tween these premia and market concentration. The estimation procedure also allows
us to include a set of control variables.
The following log fare equation is estimated,
ln pijkt = g0(HHIk) +
2∑
f=F
gf1(HHIk)qfi +Xijktφ+ αj + κk + νijkt (4.3)
where pijkt is the fare per mile of ticket (itinerary) i charged by carrier j on route
k at time t, g0(·) and gf1(·), f = F, .., 2, are unspecified smooth functions of HHI,
and Xijkt is a subvector of the controls used to estimate the no interaction model in
equation (3) and the interaction model in equation (4). More specifically, the controls
include all the ticket and flight controls used previously plus a dummy variable for
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the presence of a hub on the route. The other market controls are not included due
to multicollinearity issues in the estimation process.14
The estimation is performed over a one percent random sample of the data set,
approximately 8,740 observations, due to the computational burden of the methodol-
ogy. The random sample maintains the proportion of tickets by route, carrier and fare
type. The bandwidth of HHI was first estimated via least-squares cross validation
using a second-order Gaussian kernel function.15
Figure 10 shows how the quality premia of the different ticket group fares, over
Group 3, vary with the level of HHI. Consistent with the previous results, the Group
F premium declines in highly concentrated markets (i.e. monopoly markets). The
premium is close to 180 percent until a HHI of 0.7 and then decreases up to 130
percent at a HHI close to one. The premium of Group 1 fares shows, in turn, a
non-monotonic increase with market concentration. The premium is between 80 and
90 percent at HHI levels below 0.6 and between 125 and 130 percent at HHI levels
above 0.8. The premium of Group 2 fares does not seem to vary with the level of
competition in the market. In sum, the pattern observed is similar to the one obtained
under the least-squares approach, particularly the relative decrease of the Group F
premium and the relative increase of the Group 1 premium in highly concentrated
markets.
14Both the carrier and route effects are treated as random in this case.
15The estimation of the bandwidth of HHI also accounts for distance, per capita
income and the tourism index. These market-specific variables are then smoothed
out to derive the unspecified smooth functions, g0(·) and gf1(·), where f = F, .., 2.
For further details on the estimation method refer to Li and Racine (2007).
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation has provided new insights about the impact of market concentration
on nonlinear pricing strategies in the airline industry. The analysis develops a nonlin-
ear pricing model with both discrete product and consumer types to derive testable
implications about the impact of concentration on relative prices within a menu of
quality-price pairs. These predictions are then tested using a unique, ticket level data
set that allows us to separate wide-ranging fares with restrictive ticket characteristics
into different quality groups.
The estimation results show that market concentration differentially impacts
high versus low priced fares, as predicted by the theoretical model. Controlling for
numerous factors that may affect prices through costs and market characteristics,
high-quality fares (First Class tickets) decrease relative to low-quality fares as markets
become less competitive. The ratio of medium- to low-quality fares, however, increases
with more concentration. Separate regressions for each main carrier also suggest that
carriers do not all behave similarly when they face less competition.
Overall, the study contributes to the understanding of the effect of market struc-
ture conditions on the dispersion of airline prices. The observed relative pricing
pattern within a menu of fare types and ticket restrictions also confirms the negative
relationship between market concentration and price dispersion found in Borenstein
and Rose (1994).
From a welfare perspective, it is interesting to observe that not all travelers
are affected in the same way with a decrease in the level of competition. Business
travelers, who purchase high priced fares, end up paying relatively lower prices in less
competitive markets while leisure travelers pay more. Conversely, leisure travelers end
35
up paying relatively lower prices with more competition. This result seems reasonable
in a context where individuals with a low marginal preference for quality, e.g. leisure
travelers, are generally less brand-loyal.
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About the Sorting Condition
From the utility function, the marginal rate of substitution (MRS ) between contract
parameters p and q is given by,
MRSpq = −
∂U/∂p
∂U/∂q
=
1
θ
≈ ∆q
∆p
. (A.1)
Then,
∂MRSpq
∂θ
= − 1
θ2
< 0, (A.2)
∂MRSpq
∂d
= 0. (A.3)
From equation (A.2), consumers with a low marginal preference for quality (here-
after low-type consumers) require a higher increase in quality (q) than consumers with
a high marginal preference for quality (hereafter high-type consumers) to accept a unit
increase in price (p). In contrast, equation (A.3) indicates that the marginal rate of
substitution between the contract parameters is independent of the consumer’s loca-
tion (d). Consequently, firms are able to sort consumers with respect to their marginal
valuation for quality, but not by their horizontal location. The sorting condition does
not hold with respect to a consumer’s location.
About the Incentive-Compatibility and Participation Constraints
Since both firms face a symmetric situation, Firm 1’s decision problem is discussed
next without loss of generality. In the baseline model, this firm will select quality-price
pairs {q1(θ), p1(θ)}θ∈{θL,θH} to maximize profits subject to incentive-compatibility (IC)
and participation constraints, given the other firm’s quality-price pairs.
The incentive-compatibility constraint is equivalent to the requirement that truth
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telling is a dominant strategy for all consumers in a direct revelation game. Let
U(θ, q1, p1) = θq1 − p1. Then, the IC constraint can be expressed as,
U1(θ) = U(θ, q1(θ), p1(θ)) = max
θ˜
U(θ, q1(θ˜), p1(θ˜)). (A.4)
Regarding the participation constraints, one of them results from the competition
for customers with the other firm. A consumer of type (θ, d) will prefer the incentive-
compatible offer (q1, p1) from Firm 1 to the other firm’s incentive-compatible offer
(q2, p2) if and only if,
U1(θ) + v − td2 ≥ U2(θ) + v − t(1− d)2 (A.5)
where U2(θ) = U(θ, q2(θ), p2(θ)). The other participation constraint is the standard
individual-rationality (IR) constraint under monopolistic nonlinear pricing. This con-
straint implies that a consumer of type (θ, d) will prefer incentive-compatible offer
(q1, p1) from Firm 1 to not buying if and only if,
U1(θ) + v − td2 ≥ 0. (A.6)
Condition (A.6) is slack for all consumer types since it is assumed that the
reservation utility of making a purchase v is sufficiently high that, in equilibrium, all
individuals make a purchase. From condition (A.5), Firm 1’s demand functions for
the low- and high-quality products are respectively given by,
x1L = dL =
t+ θL(q1L − q2L)− (p1L − p2L)
2t
, (A.7)
x1H = dH =
t+ θH(q1H − q2H)− (p1H − p2H)
2t
. (A.8)
The demand functions for Firm 2’s product types are then 1 − dL and 1 − dH .
It is further assumed that the quality difference between the high- and low-type
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product is a fixed proportion, such that qiH = δqiL, i = 1, 2, where δ > 1. The
model can then be solved as a two-stage non-cooperative game and a subgame-perfect
symmetric equilibrium can be derived where the incentive-compatibility constraint for
high-type consumers (ICH) binds and the incentive-compatibility constraint for low-
type consumers (ICL) does not. In the first stage firms set quality and in the second
stage they compete in prices.
In the case of the first model extension which also includes a medium-quality
product and a medium-type consumer, Firm 1’s demand function for this product
type is given by,
x1M = dM =
t+ θM(q1M − q2M)− (p1M − p2M)
2t
(A.9)
where θM is the marginal preference for quality of medium-type consumers and qiM
and piM , i = 1, 2, are the quality and price, respectively, of the medium-type product.
Obviously, θH > θM > θL. The demand functions for the other two product types
are similar to those specified in equations (A.7) and (A.8).
This model extension requires six incentive-compatibility conditions to ensure
that consumers will choose the product type designed for them. It is assumed that in
equilibrium high-type consumers will be indifferent between buying high- or medium-
quality products, while medium-type consumers will be indifferent between buying
medium- or low-quality products. Then, piH = piM + θH(qiH − qiM) and piM =
piL + θM(qiM − qiL) for i = 1, 2. The model can be solved as a two-stage non-
cooperative game by further assuming that the quality differences between the high-
and low-type product and the medium- and low-type product are a fixed proportion.
Specifically, qiH = δ1qiL and qiM = δ2qiL, i = 1, 2, where δ1 > δ2 > 1.
In the case of the second model extension which includes two product qualities
and two product types, but tH > tL, the demand functions for the low- and high-
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quality products are, respectively, given by,
x1L = dL =
tL + θL(q1L − q2L)− (p1L − p2L)
2tL
, (A.10)
x1H = dH =
tH + θH(q1H − q2H)− (p1H − p2H)
2tH
. (A.11)
As in the baseline model, qiH = δqiL, i = 1, 2, where δ > 1. The model can also
be solved as a two-stage non-cooperative game by assuming that the (ICH) constraint
binds and the (ICL) constraint does not.
Subgame-perfect equilibrium1
The steps involved to derive a subgame-perfect symmetric equilibrium for the baseline
model, where the (ICH) constraint binds and the (ICL) constraint does not, are de-
scribed next.2 From the (ICH) constraint binding, piH = piL+ θH(qiH − qiL), i = 1, 2,
and given that qiH = δqiL, where δ > 1, the maximization problem presented in
Chapter II can be transformed into the following problem with decision variables piL
and qiL,
Max
piL,qiL
pii = λ[(piL − cqiL)xiL]− q
2
iL
2
+ (1− λ)[(piL + θH(δ − 1)qiL
− cδqiL)xiH ]− δ
2q2iL
2
1This section follows Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005). These authors look for a
subgame-perfect equilibrium in a three-stage non-cooperative game where firms first
choose location, then they decide the level of R&D to improve the quality of the
product, and finally they compete in prices. In their model each firm only offers one
product variety.
2Details of the derivation of a subgame-perfect symmetric equilibrium for the two
model extensions are available upon request.
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where x1L = dL and x1H = dH , which are specified in equations (A.7) and (A.8)
respectively, while x2L = 1−dL and x2H = 1−dH .3 To simplify the analysis, in what
follows c is normalized to zero.
The price subgame is first examined which corresponds to the last stage of the
game. From the first-order conditions, the following equilibrium prices are derived,
piL = t+
(
1
3
λθL + (1− λ)θH − 2
3
δ(1− λ)θH
)
qiL (A.12)
−1
3
(λθL + δ(1− λ)θH)qjL.
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. The second-order condition, given by ∂2pii/∂p2iL =− 1/t < 0,
is satisfied.
Next, these equilibrium prices piL, i = 1, 2, are substituted in the profit functions
in order to move to the first stage of the game where firms set quality. After taking
first-order conditions from the new expressions for profits, the following best-response
functions are obtained,
qiL(qjL) =
1
2
AqjL − 6(δ(1− λ)θH + λθL)t
B − 9(δ2 + 1)t (A.13)
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, A = 9λ(1 − λ)(δ − 1)θ2H + 2(λ2θ2L + δ2θ2H) − λ(1 − λ)(5δ −
9)θLθH − 2λ(2−λ)δ2θ2H and B = λ2θ2L+ δ2θ2H +9λ(1−λ)(θ2H(δ− 1)+ θLθH)− 7λ(1−
λ)δθLθH − λ(2 − λ)δ2θ2H . The equilibrium qualities qiL, i = 1, 2, are finally derived
from the intersection of the best-response functions,
qiL =
(B − 9(δ2 + 1)t)2(δ(1− λ)θH + λθL)(6t)
(
A
B−9(δ2+1)t + 2
)
(A2 − 4(B − 9(δ2 + 1)t)2)(B − 9(δ2 + 1)t) . (A.14)
3It is also necessary to check at the proposed solution whether the low-type con-
sumers strictly prefer the low-quality product since the analysis looks for an equilib-
rium where the (ICL) constraint is slack. Similarly, the solution must be an interior
solution where both firms are active.
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Without loss of generality and for clarity of exposition, hereafter it is assumed
that certain parameters take a specific value.4 More specifically, it is assumed that
60% of the customers are low-type individuals, i.e. λ = 0.6, δ = 2 and θL = 0.5.
The associated second-order condition of the first stage of the game, where firms
set quality, requires that t > 1
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(2.8θ2H − 0.6θH + 0.09). This condition also implies
that best-response functions specified in equation (A.13) are negative sloped. The
stability condition requires, in turn, that |dqiL/dqjL| < 1, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and is
satisfied if t > 1
90
(9.04θ2H − 1.32θH + 0.36). Figure 11 presents both the second-order
condition and the stability condition on the space (t, θH) for θH > 0.5.
5 It follows
that satisfying the stability condition is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an
equilibrium at the first stage of the game and hence in the overall game.
The following can be concluded: if firms compete by setting the quality and
price of the low-type product while the quality of the high-type product is given by
qH = δqL, δ > 1, then for a sufficiently high t there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium
where the (ICH) constraint binds and the (ICL) constraint does not. The equilibrium
involves full-market coverage and is symmetric.
The equilibrium low-type price and quality, under the previous assumptions, are
given by,
p∗L = t−
(0.53θ2H + 0.2θH)t
25t+ 0.3θH − 0.6θ2H
, (A.15)
q∗L =
(1.33θH + 0.5)t
25t+ 0.3θH − 0.6θ2H
, (A.16)
4This procedure is standard in this class of models and allows us to later evaluate
the impact of competition, measured through t, on relative prices.
5Note that, by definition, θH > θL = 0.5. This condition also ensures that low-
type consumers strictly prefer the low-quality product, i.e. the (ICL) constraint is
slack.
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while the equilibrium high-type price and quality reduce to,
p∗H = t+
(0.79θ2H + 0.29θH)t
25t+ 0.3θH − 0.6θ2H
, (A.17)
q∗H =
(2.67θH + 1)t
25t+ 0.3θH − 0.6θ2H
. (A.18)
Figure 1 presents the impact of t, the index of competition intensity, on the
optimal price ratio p∗H/p
∗
L for θH = 1 and t ≥ 0.1.6 As can be seen, relative prices
decrease with market concentration (higher t). The inverse relationship between
relative prices and market concentration holds for any value of θH > 0.5.
Figure 2 shows the impact of competition on relative prices when the model is
extended to three product qualities (high, medium and low), three consumer types
(high, medium and low marginal preference for quality) and t ≥ 0.1. It is assumed
that θL = 0.4, θM = 0.6, δ1 = 4, and δ2 = 2, and θH is set to one to derive the figure.
7
The price ratio of high to low-quality products decreases proportionally more than
the price ratio of medium to low-quality products with a higher t.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the impact of competition on relative prices under the
second model extension with different per-unit transportation costs across the two
consumer types. Specifically, 0.1 ≤ tL ≤ 0.25 and 0.25 ≤ tH ≤ 0.5. In this case θH is
also set to one to derive the figure.8 There is a negative relationship between market
concentration and relative prices, but this inverse relationship is more pronounced
with changes in the level of competition for low-type consumers (tL), which are more
likely to switch firms.
6The stability condition requires that t ≥ 0.09 for θH = 1.
7The stability condition requires that t ≥ 0.05 for θH = 1.
8The other parameters take the same value as in the baseline model. For the
stability condition to hold, both tL ≥ 0.09 and tH ≥ 0.09 for θH = 1.
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
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Below is a full description of the variables used in the analysis:
Fare: Roundtrip fare paid. In case of one-way tickets, the fare paid is multiplied
by two.
Fare per mile: Roundtrip fare (in cents) divided by two times nonstop origin to
destination mileage.
Group F : Equal to one if any segment of the itinerary involves travel in first class.
Otherwise, equal to zero. Group F is the highest quality group.
Group 1 : Equal to one if ticket is refundable and all segments of the itinerary involve
travel in business, full coach or coach class. Otherwise, equal to zero. A full coach
fare has features that allow for upgrades and last seat availability.
Group 2 : Equal to one if ticket is nonrefundable but does not carry any travel or stay
restrictions. Otherwise, equal to zero. A travel restriction indicates that the ticket
includes a travel day restriction, e.g. that the individual must travel during certain
days of the week. A stay restriction indicates that the ticket includes a minimum
and/or maximum stay requirement, e.g. that the individual must return after a cer-
tain number of days.
Group 3 : Equal to one if ticket is nonrefundable with travel and/or stay restric-
tions. Otherwise, equal to zero. Group 3 is the lowest quality group.
Market share: Fraction of nonstop passengers transported by a carrier on a route
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during the fourth quarter of 2004.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): Sum of the square of market shares of each of
the carriers operating on a route.
Monopoly : Equal to one in routes on which a single carrier transports more than
90 percent of nonstop passengers. Otherwise, equal to zero. This definition is in line
with Borenstein and Rose (1994), but the number of nonstop passengers on a route
are used instead of number of flights to calculate market shares.
Duopoly : Equal to one in non-monopoly routes on which two carriers cumulatively
transport more than 90 percent of nonstop passengers. Otherwise, equal to zero.
Competitive: Equal to one in routes that are neither monopolies nor duopolies, oth-
erwise zero.
Advance purchase: Categorical variables indicating whether the ticket was purchased
0–3 days prior to departure (Adv0 3 ), 4–6 days (Adv4 6 ), 7–13 days (Adv7 13 ), 14–21
days (Adv14 21 ) and over 21 days (Adv22 over).
One-way : Equal to one if ticket is one-way, otherwise zero.
Load factor at purchase: Average load factor of the itinerary’s flight segments one day
before the ticket was purchased. For example, consider a ticket bought on Novem-
ber 5, 2004 for travel on November 7, 2004 from New York-Kennedy (JFK) to Los
Angeles (LAX) on American Flight 117, and travel back on November 9, 2004 on
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American Flight 22. The load factor at purchase for this itinerary is the average of
the estimated load factors for these two flights at November 4, 2004 (one day before
the ticket was purchased). The load factor at each flight segment is derived following
the methodology applied by Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins (2007). Basically, from
the data provided by the CRS vendor, the total number of tickets sold on each of the
flights involved in an itinerary until the day before the individual transaction took
place can be observed. These observed tickets can then be scaled up by the inverse of
the CRS’ total share of tickets sold at the carrier-route level, to obtain an estimate
of the total sales for each flight. This scale factor is obtained by dividing the total
number of nonstop itineraries sold through the CRS in the last quarter of 2004 at the
carrier-route level, by the corresponding total number of tickets sold reported by the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). These scaled number of tickets sold are
finally divided by the total number of seats available for each flight, obtained from
the Official Airline Guide (OAG).
Peak time: Equal to one if the itinerary involves departure and/or return on weekdays
between 7 and 10am or 3 and 7pm, otherwise zero.
Hub for carrier : Equal to one if either of the endpoint airports on a route is a
primary or secondary hub for the operating carrier, otherwise zero.
Slot-controlled airport : Equal to one if the number of takeoffs and landings at either
endpoint airport on a route is regulated, otherwise zero. The three slot-controlled
airports during the period of analysis were Washington-National (DCA), New York-
Kennedy (JFK), and New York-La Guardia (LGA).
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Southwest on route: Equal to one if Southwest has five percent or more of the mar-
ket share on the route, otherwise zero. The five percent threshold follows Lee and
Luengo-Prado (2005).
Low cost carrier on route: Equal to one if low-cost carriers, other than Southwest,
collectively have five percent or more of the market share on the route, otherwise zero.
The low-cost carriers include Frontier, AirTran, Spirit, ATA, Sun Country, JetBlue,
Allegiant, Primaris and Independence.
Distance: Nonstop mileage between the two endpoint airports on a route.
Total flights : Total number of direct flights between the two endpoint airports on
a route.
Per-capita income: Average 2004 per capita personal income at the two endpoint
Metropolitan areas of a route.
Temperature difference: Absolute difference in average October temperatures be-
tween the origin and destination of a route.
Tourism index : 2004 accommodation earnings divided by personal income at the
Metropolitan area of destination of the itinerary. The accommodation subsector
(Code 721 in the North American Industry Classification System) includes traveler
accommodation, recreational accommodation and rooming and boarding houses.
Main carriers : Categorical variables indicating whether the ticket involved travel-
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ing in one of the major carriers in the sample. These include American (AA), United
(UA), Delta (DL), Continental (CO), US Airways (US ) and Northwest (NW ), all
of whom transported at least five percent of all domestic travelers during the last
quarter of 2004.
Instruments description
Geoshare: Instrument for market share. Following Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein
and Rose (1994), it is defined as a carrier’s geometric mean of enplanements at the
endpoint airports of a route, divided by the sum of all carriers’ geometric mean of
enplanements at the endpoint airports. Formally,
Geoshare =
√
ENPi1 · ENPi2∑
j
√
ENPj1 · ENPj2
,
where j indexes all carriers, i is the observed carrier, and ENPj1 and ENPj2 are
carrier j ’s average daily enplanements at the two endpoint airports during the fourth
quarter of 2004. This instrument is valid under the assumption that a carrier’s cur-
rent price responds to actual competition but not to entry threats.
Xtherf : Instrument for HHI. Following Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein and Rose
(1994), it is defined as the square of the fitted value of market share ̂MktShare (from
its first-stage regression) plus the rescaled sum of the square of all other carriers’ share
on the route. Specifically,
Xtherf = ̂MktShare
2
+
HHI −MktShare2
(1−MktShare)2 (1−
̂MktShare)2.
This instrument is valid under the assumption that the observed carrier’s price does
not affect the allocation of passengers it does not get.
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Population: Instrument for the total number of flights on a route. It is defined
as the average 2004 midyear population estimates (in thousands) at the two endpoint
Metropolitan areas of a route.
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Figure 1.— Price Ratio and Intensity of Competition
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Note: θH = 1, θL = 0.5. This pattern holds for any value of θH > θL.
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Figure 2.— Price Ratios and Intensity of Competition, 3 Types
 
PM/PL 
PH/PL 
More 
competition 
Less 
competition 
Note: θH = 1, θM = 0.6, θL = 0.4. This pattern holds for any value of θH > θM > θL.
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Figure 3.— Price Ratio and Intensity of Competition, tH > tL
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Figure 4.— Kernel Density Estimates of Matched vs. All Fares
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Note: Bandwidths (h) computed using normal-reference “rule of thumb”, i.e. hj = 1.06σjn
−1/5, where σj is the
standard deviation of fares and nj the number of observations for j = {matched data, unmatched data}. The kernel
type used is second-order Gaussian.
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Figure 5.— Average Price per Mile
By fare type
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Note: Price per mile = roundtrip fare (in cents) / (2 x nonstop origin to destination mileage).
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Figure 6.— Relative Prices by Fare Type and Market Structure
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Note: Relative prices are a weighted average of the relative fares by flying distance for each market structure.
Market structure categories defined according to Borenstein and Rose (1994).
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Figure 7.— Relative Prices by Fare Type and Alternative Market Structure Definitions
Verlinda (2005)
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Note: Relative prices are a weighted average of the relative fares by flying distance under each market structure.
In Verlinda (2005), a route is considered a monopoly if a carrier transports at least 50 percent of nonstop passengers
and the share of the second major carrier is less than one ninth of the share of the first carrier. A non-monopoly
route is considered a duopoly if two carriers cumulatively transport at least 50 percent of nonstop passengers and
the share of the third major carrier is less than one ninth of the share of the second carrier. All other routes are
considered competitive.
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Figure 8.— UA Relative Prices by Fare Type and Day of Purchase, Short-Distance
Routes
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Note: Relative prices are the ratio of average fares per mile for a given day prior to departure.
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Figure 9.— UA Relative Prices by Fare Type and Day of Purchase, Long-Distance
Routes
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Note: Relative prices are the ratio of average fares per mile for a given day prior to departure.
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Figure 10.— Quality Premia by Market Concentration, Smooth Coefficient Model
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Note: Bandwidth of HHI estimated via least squares cross-validation, accounting also for distance, per capita
income and tourism index at the route level. The kernel type used is second-order Gaussian. The unspecified
smooth functions, g0(HHI) and gf1(HHI), f = F, .., 2, were derived by smoothing out the market-specific variables.
Controls at the ticket and flight level include time of purchase, one-way travel, load factor at purchase and peak
periods. The estimation also controls for the presence of a hub on the route.
66
Figure 11.— Conditions for Existence and Stability of Equilibrium
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Note: θL = 0.5.
67
Table 1.— Routes by Market Structure
Competitive
ATL-EWR ATL-IAD ATL-MEM ATL-MIA ATL-ORD ATL-PHL BOS-DCA
BOS-FLL BOS-LAX BOS-LGA CLE-LGA CLE-ORD CLT-ORD CVG-ORD
DEN-ATL DEN-DFW DEN-IAH DEN-PDX DEN-PHL DEN-PHX DEN-SLC
DEN-STL DFW-ATL DFW-IAH DFW-MSP DFW-PHX DTW-EWR DTW-LAS
DTW-ORD FLL-LGA FLL-PHL IAD-BOS JFK-LAS JFK-SFO LAS-ATL
LAS-DEN LAS-DFW LAS-MSP LAS-SEA LAX-DEN LAX-EWR LAX-HNL
LAX-JFK LAX-LAS LAX-PHL LAX-SMF LGA-MCO MCO-BOS MCO-LAX
MCO-ORD MSP-DEN MSP-EWR MSP-PHX ORD-EWR ORD-FLL ORD-IAD
ORD-IAH ORD-LAS ORD-MSP ORD-MSY ORD-PHL ORD-PIT PDX-LAS
PDX-SFO PDX-SJC PHL-MCO PHL-PHX PHX-BUR PHX-DTW PHX-LAX
PHX-ORD PHX-PDX RDU-LGA RDU-ORD SAN-JFK SEA-DEN SEA-JFK
SEA-ORD SEA-PHX SJC-LAS SJC-LAX SLC-LAX STL-ORD TPA-ORD
Duopoly
ATL-BWI ATL-DCA ATL-FLL ATL-IAH ATL-LGA ATL-MCO ATL-MSY
ATL-TPA BDL-DCA BOS-ATL BOS-EWR BOS-ORD BOS-PHL BOS-SFO
BOS-TPA BWI-BOS BWI-DFW BWI-LAX BWI-ORD DCA-ORD DEN-BOS
DEN-DCA DEN-EWR DEN-LGA DEN-MCI DEN-MCO DEN-SJC DFW-BOS
DFW-DTW DFW-IAD DFW-LAX DFW-MCI DFW-MCO DFW-SFO DTW-ATL
DTW-LGA DTW-MCO EWR-DCA EWR-DFW EWR-LAS EWR-MDW EWR-PHX
FLL-DCA FLL-DFW FLL-EWR FLL-JFK FLL-LAX HPN-ORD IAD-DEN
IAD-LAS IND-DFW JFK-MCO LAS-BOS LAS-BWI LAS-SFO LAX-DTW
LAX-IAD LAX-ORD LAX-STL LGA-DCA LGA-DFW LGA-ORD LGA-TPA
MCI-ORD MCO-BDL MCO-EWR MCO-IAD MCO-MSP MDW-DEN MDW-DFW
MIA-EWR MIA-ORD MSP-MDW MSP-MKE OAK-LAX OAK-PDX OAK-SEA
OMA-ORD ORD-BDL ORD-CMH ORD-DEN ORD-DFW ORD-SAN ORD-SNA
PBI-BOS PBI-LGA PBI-PHL PDX-LAX PHL-DFW PHL-LAS PHL-SFO
PHX-LAS PHX-OAK PHX-SJC RDU-ATL SAN-DEN SAN-DFW SAN-PHX
SEA-DFW SEA-LAX SEA-SMF SFO-ATL SFO-DEN SFO-EWR SFO-LAX
SFO-ORD SFO-SEA SFO-SNA SJC-SAN SJC-SEA SLC-SEA SLC-SNA
SNA-DEN SNA-LAS SNA-OAK SNA-SJC STL-BWI TPA-DFW TPA-PHL
Monopoly
ATL-LAX BOS-MIA BOS-PIT CLT-LGA CVG-ATL CVG-LGA DCA-MCO
DFW-DCA DTW-BOS EWR-CLE EWR-IAH EWR-PBI IAH-BOS IAH-LAS
IAH-MCO IAH-TPA JFK-MIA LAX-IAH LAX-TPA LGA-IAH LGA-MIA
LGA-MSP LGA-PIT MDW-LGA MIA-LAX MSP-DTW MSP-LAX MSY-IAH
OAK-DEN PDX-SAN PIT-PHL SAN-SEA SAN-SFO SEA-MSP SEA-SNA
SFO-IAD SFO-MSP SJC-AUS SJC-DFW SNA-DFW STL-DFW STL-LGA
TPA-EWR
Note: Market structure categories defined according to Borenstein and Rose (1994). Airport codes: ATL =
Atlanta, AUS = Austin, BDL = Hartford, BOS = Boston, BUR = Burbank, BWI = Baltimore, CLE = Cleveland,
CLT = Charlotte, CMH = Colombus, CVG = Cincinnati, DCA = Washington-National, DEN = Denver, DFW =
Dallas-Ft. Worth, DTW = Detroit, EWR = Newark, FLL = Fort Lauderdale, HNL = Honolulu, HPN = NY-White
Plains, IAD = Washington-Dulles, IAH = Houston, IND = Indianapolis, JFK = NY-Kennedy, LAS = Las Vegas,
LAX = Los Angeles, LGA = NY-La Guardia, MCI = Kansas City, MCO = Orlando, MDW = Chicago-Midway,
MEM = Memphis, MIA = Miami, MKE = Milwaukee, MSP = Minneapolis-St. Paul, MSY = New Orleans, OAK =
Oakland, OMA = Omaha, ORD = Chicago-O Hare, PBI = West Palm Beach, PDX = Portland, PHL =
Philadelphia, PHX - Phoenix, PIT = Pittsburgh, RDU = Raleigh-Durham, SAN = San Diego, SEA = Seattle, SFO
= San Francisco, SJC = San Jose, SLC = Salt Lake City, SMF = Sacramento, SNA = Santa Ana, STL = St. Louis,
TPA = Tampa.
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Table 2.— Mean Deviations of Price per Mile by Fare Type and Carrier
American United Delta Continental US Airways Northwest
Group F 34.5 80.6 49.7 43.2 36.5 59.4
Group 1 12.0 21.7 17.4 15.3 6.7 18.3
Group 2 1.6 -8.8 -4.9 0.1 -7.8 -0.9
Group 3 -6.0 -15.4 -14.8 -9.3 -14.2 -10.5
Note: The mean deviations are a weighted average of the deviations from the mean price per mile by group and
route for each carrier. Each of these carriers transported at least five percent of all domestic travelers during the
fourth quarter of 2004.
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Table 3.— Sources of Information for Market Controls
Source Variables
T-100 Domestic Data (U.S. Carriers) Market share, HHI, market structure dummies, distance, Southwest
http://www.bts.gov and low cost carrier dummies, total flights, and geoshare
Bureau of Economic Analysis
Per capita income, tourism index
http://www.bea.gov
U.S. Census Bureau
Population
http://www.census.gov
National Climatic Data Center (NCDC)
Temperature difference
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/ncdc.html
U.S. Weather Information (for missing cities)
http://www.countrystudies.us
Wikipedia
Hubs, low cost carriers (identification)
http://en.wikipedia.org
Stavins (2001) Slot controlled airports
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Table 4.— Summary Statistics for Variables in Analysis
Mean St. dev. Min Max
Fare (dollars) 457 464 62 4,806
Fare per mile (cents) 31.3 32.0 3.4 305.9
Dummies for fare type
Group F 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Group 1 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Group 2 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Group 3 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Market structure variables
Market share 0.57 0.26 0.00 1.00
HHI 0.56 0.20 0.19 1.00
Monopoly 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Duopoly 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Competitive 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Ticket and flight controls
Adv0 3 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00
Adv4 6 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Adv7 13 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Adv14 21 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
Adv22 over 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
One-way 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Load factor at purchase 0.44 0.29 0.00 1.37
Peak time 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Market controls
Hub for carrier 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00
Slot-controlled airport 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00
Southwest on route 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Low cost carrier on route 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Distance 1,020 654 185 2,704
Total flights on route 2,785 1,390 341 6,576
Per capita income (dollars) 38,693 3,461 31,811 48,150
Temperature difference 9.61 6.77 0.10 26.70
Tourism index 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.13
Main carriers
AA 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
UA 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
DL 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
CO 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
US 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
NW 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
# observations 878,169
Note: For a detailed description of the variables refer to Appendix B.
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Table 5.— Distribution of Tickets and Routes by Market Structure and Flying Dis-
tance
Tickets Routes Tickets per route
# % # %
By market structure
Competitive 351,570 40.0 84 34.2 4,185
Duopoly 418,982 47.7 119 48.4 3,521
Monopoly 107,617 12.3 43 17.5 2,503
Total 878,169 100.0 246 100.0 3,570
By route distance
1. Below 500 miles
Competitive 76,735 41.6 21 38.9 3,654
Duopoly 91,242 49.5 26 48.1 3,509
Monopoly 16,454 8.9 7 13.0 2,351
Total 184,431 100.0 54 100.0 3,415
2. 500 - 749 miles
Competitive 98,207 51.4 18 39.1 5,456
Duopoly 77,339 40.5 22 47.8 3,515
Monopoly 15,513 8.1 6 13.0 2,586
Total 191,059 100.0 46 100.0 4,153
3. 750 - 999 miles
Competitive 44,955 26.8 13 28.3 3,458
Duopoly 102,981 61.3 25 54.3 4,119
Monopoly 19,954 11.9 8 17.4 2,494
Total 167,890 100.0 46 100.0 3,650
4. 1,000 - 1,499 miles
Competitive 54,034 34.7 15 29.4 3,602
Duopoly 61,822 39.7 21 41.2 2,944
Monopoly 39,702 25.5 15 29.4 2,647
Total 155,558 100.0 51 100.0 3,050
5. Over 1,499 miles
Competitive 77,639 43.3 17 34.7 4,567
Duopoly 85,598 47.8 25 51.0 3,424
Monopoly 15,994 8.9 7 14.3 2,285
Total 179,231 100.0 49 100.0 3,658
Note: Market structure categories defined according to Borenstein and Rose (1994).
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Table 6.— Log of Fare per Mile Regressions, No-Interaction Models
Model 1: HHI Model 2: Structural Categories
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Group F 1.595 0.037 1.683 0.036 1.601 0.037 1.688 0.039
Group 1 0.672 0.067 0.670 0.075 0.673 0.066 0.653 0.070
Group 2 0.314 0.024 0.309 0.022 0.316 0.025 0.313 0.022
Market share 0.123 0.081 -0.032 0.109 0.121 0.064 -0.308 0.184
HHI 0.159 0.092 -0.704 0.272
Monopoly 0.145 0.052 -0.197 0.148
Duopoly -0.006 0.025 -0.147 0.071
Adv0 3 0.147 0.030 0.167 0.028 0.142 0.028 0.157 0.026
Adv4 6 0.133 0.027 0.140 0.025 0.128 0.025 0.132 0.023
Adv7 13 0.124 0.022 0.122 0.019 0.119 0.021 0.116 0.018
Adv14 21 0.066 0.014 0.068 0.013 0.064 0.013 0.063 0.012
One-way 0.177 0.017 0.159 0.019 0.177 0.017 0.157 0.020
Load factor at purchase 0.118 0.025 0.126 0.021 0.121 0.024 0.152 0.020
Peak time 0.031 0.006 0.025 0.008 0.031 0.006 0.026 0.008
Hub for carrier 0.186 0.048 0.421 0.101 0.190 0.049 0.454 0.104
Slot-controlled airport 0.075 0.030 0.179 0.043 0.059 0.030 0.185 0.040
Southwest on route -0.279 0.046 -0.402 0.074 -0.264 0.047 -0.382 0.064
Low cost carrier on route -0.103 0.036 -0.100 0.039 -0.096 0.037 -0.108 0.041
Log distance -0.739 0.022 -0.948 0.063 -0.744 0.021 -0.942 0.060
Log total flights on route 0.022 0.030 -0.611 0.170 0.028 0.031 -0.591 0.160
Log per capita income 0.438 0.158 0.700 0.237 0.543 0.153 0.734 0.223
Log temperature difference 0.013 0.018 0.009 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.008 0.018
Tourism index -0.936 0.284 -1.406 0.511 -0.881 0.270 -1.410 0.528
Constant 2.719 1.762 6.642 3.068 1.628 1.680 5.973 2.826
Underidentification test :
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat. 981.17 1023.65
Chi-sq(1) P-val (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification test :
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 547.92 955.04
# observations 878,169 878,169 878,169 878,169
R-squared 0.776 0.711 0.777 0.715
Note: Fare per mile = roundtrip fare (in cents) / (2 x nonstop origin to destination mileage). All regressions
include carrier fixed effects. White robust standard errors reported, clustered on origin city. Market share and HHI
instrumented using the same instruments as Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein and Rose (1994). Log of total flights
instrumented with the log of population. The underidentification and weak identification tests follow Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) and are heteroskedastic-robust.
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Table 7.— Log of Fare per Mile Regressions, Interaction Models
Model 1: HHI Model 2: Structural Categories
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Group F 1.791 0.067 1.843 0.078 1.621 0.034 1.714 0.031
Group 1 0.172 0.107 0.270 0.138 0.545 0.075 0.539 0.084
Group 2 0.356 0.052 0.254 0.062 0.300 0.022 0.283 0.022
Market share 0.141 0.081 0.013 0.104 0.146 0.059 -0.245 0.173
HHI 0.001 0.069 -0.875 0.257
Monopoly 0.030 0.035 -0.316 0.146
Duopoly -0.041 0.020 -0.186 0.075
Group F*HHI -0.363 0.141 -0.302 0.170
Group 1*HHI 0.854 0.155 0.683 0.199
Group 2*HHI -0.073 0.098 0.100 0.121
Group F*Monopoly -0.364 0.074 -0.425 0.073
Group F*Duopoly -0.013 0.045 -0.022 0.054
Group 1*Monopoly 0.522 0.095 0.469 0.095
Group 1*Duopoly 0.086 0.073 0.073 0.084
Group 2*Monopoly -0.044 0.068 0.005 0.065
Group 2*Duopoly 0.043 0.030 0.060 0.025
Adv0 3 0.144 0.028 0.166 0.027 0.145 0.028 0.161 0.026
Adv4 6 0.129 0.025 0.138 0.024 0.128 0.025 0.133 0.023
Adv7 13 0.117 0.021 0.117 0.019 0.116 0.020 0.114 0.017
Adv14 21 0.064 0.013 0.067 0.012 0.063 0.012 0.063 0.011
One-way 0.179 0.016 0.162 0.019 0.180 0.017 0.160 0.020
Load factor at purchase 0.121 0.025 0.126 0.021 0.117 0.024 0.147 0.020
Peak time 0.029 0.006 0.024 0.008 0.029 0.006 0.025 0.008
Hub for carrier 0.175 0.043 0.402 0.095 0.176 0.044 0.430 0.096
Slot-controlled airport 0.072 0.031 0.176 0.046 0.048 0.029 0.172 0.040
Southwest on route -0.244 0.045 -0.375 0.074 -0.228 0.047 -0.347 0.063
Low cost carrier on route -0.112 0.038 -0.105 0.039 -0.101 0.038 -0.112 0.043
Log distance -0.739 0.020 -0.947 0.063 -0.748 0.019 -0.941 0.060
Log total flights on route 0.029 0.026 -0.600 0.170 0.035 0.029 -0.570 0.157
Log per capita income 0.439 0.148 0.693 0.231 0.619 0.138 0.799 0.216
Log temperature difference 0.009 0.018 0.005 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.004 0.017
Tourism index -0.953 0.288 -1.403 0.503 -0.887 0.272 -1.396 0.502
Constant 2.714 1.626 6.678 3.083 0.828 1.493 5.145 2.725
Underidentification test :
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat. 1094.25 1116.89
Chi-sq(1) P-val (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification test :
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 299.45 975.27
# observations 878,169 878,169 878,169 878,169
R-squared 0.783 0.719 0.785 0.726
Note: Fare per mile = roundtrip fare (in cents) / (2 x nonstop origin to destination mileage). All regressions
include carrier fixed effects. White robust standard errors reported, clustered on origin city. Market share and HHI
instrumented using the same instruments as Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein and Rose (1994). Log of total flights
instrumented with the log of population. The underidentification and weak identification tests follow Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) and are heteroskedastic-robust.
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Table 8.— Quality Premia by Market Structure
Model 1: HHI
HHI0.1 = 0.34 HHI0.5 = 0.51 HHI0.9 = 0.89
Relative to Group 3,
Group F 174% 169% 158%
Group 1 50% 62% 88%
Group 2 29% 30% 34%
Model 2: Structural Categories
Competitive Duopoly Monopoly
Relative to Group 3,
Group F 171% 169% 129%
Group 1 54% 61% 101%
Group 2 28% 34% 29%
Note: Market structure categories defined according to Borenstein and Rose (1994).
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Table 9.— Log of Fare per Mile Regressions by Carrier, 2SLS
American United
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Group F 1.646 0.112 1.437 0.084 1.979 0.199 1.821 0.047
Group 1 -0.141 0.363 0.298 0.187 0.535 0.312 0.669 0.158
Group 2 0.194 0.117 0.242 0.040 0.032 0.073 0.190 0.035
Market share 0.161 0.185 0.379 0.210 -0.019 0.232 -0.358 0.255
HHI -0.598 0.576 -0.337 0.250
Monopoly -0.458 0.236 0.192 0.144
Duopoly -0.157 0.120 0.059 0.048
Group F*HHI -0.525 0.170 -0.464 0.424
Group 1*HHI 1.274 0.566 0.375 0.507
Group 2*HHI 0.116 0.174 0.550 0.103
Group F*Monopoly -0.233 0.093 -0.588 0.201
Group F*Duopoly -0.209 0.080 -0.094 0.085
Group 1*Monopoly 0.807 0.236 0.201 0.208
Group 1*Duopoly 0.319 0.241 0.125 0.159
Group 2*Monopoly -0.019 0.081 0.377 0.082
Group 2*Duopoly 0.053 0.048 0.210 0.028
Adv0 3 0.258 0.020 0.262 0.018 0.094 0.043 0.096 0.043
Adv4 6 0.216 0.018 0.225 0.017 0.078 0.033 0.079 0.034
Adv7 13 0.163 0.019 0.172 0.019 0.064 0.024 0.062 0.024
Adv14 21 0.096 0.008 0.092 0.008 0.045 0.010 0.048 0.011
One-way 0.075 0.035 0.081 0.025 0.296 0.023 0.297 0.026
Load factor at purchase 0.232 0.026 0.224 0.022 0.144 0.035 0.140 0.033
Peak time 0.035 0.008 0.032 0.008 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.013
Hub for carrier 0.296 0.121 0.254 0.076 0.505 0.215 0.821 0.227
Slot-controlled airport 0.114 0.064 0.110 0.052 0.207 0.037 0.190 0.038
Southwest on route -0.458 0.109 -0.443 0.085 -0.225 0.080 -0.288 0.086
Low cost carrier on route -0.143 0.027 -0.156 0.035 0.026 0.047 0.104 0.068
Log distance -0.844 0.105 -0.838 0.075 -0.825 0.059 -0.795 0.046
Log total flights on route -0.307 0.302 -0.196 0.149 -0.343 0.118 -0.278 0.092
Log per capita income 1.009 0.327 1.152 0.343 0.848 0.223 0.739 0.195
Log temperature difference -0.004 0.028 -0.004 0.028 0.010 0.016 -0.001 0.013
Tourism index -1.461 0.507 -1.495 0.575 0.051 0.829 0.476 0.831
Constant 0.030 3.810 -2.674 3.341 1.602 2.035 1.697 1.669
Underidentification test :
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat. 34.09 105.23 93.15 108.16
Chi-sq(1) P-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak identification test :
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 7.83 71.51 108.68 253.15
# observations 245,684 245,684 175,910 175,910
R-squared 0.667 0.684 0.753 0.760
76
Table 9.— Continued
Delta Continental
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Group F 1.737 0.078 1.729 0.042 1.025 0.104 1.204 0.259
Group 1 0.866 0.214 0.853 0.139 1.111 0.258 1.228 0.524
Group 2 0.272 0.086 0.354 0.030 0.318 0.116 0.351 0.118
Market share -0.533 0.234 -0.422 0.206 0.605 0.460 4.522 2.204
HHI 0.218 0.195 -1.768 0.530
Monopoly 0.030 0.119 -1.468 1.272
Duopoly -0.070 0.054 -0.279 0.787
Group F*HHI -0.045 0.124 0.795 0.149
Group 1*HHI -0.107 0.266 0.233 0.368
Group 2*HHI 0.237 0.128 0.086 0.162
Group F*Monopoly -0.619 0.049 0.075 0.342
Group F*Duopoly 0.034 0.037 0.104 0.264
Group 1*Monopoly 0.047 0.157 -0.420 0.772
Group 1*Duopoly -0.173 0.169 -1.181 1.009
Group 2*Monopoly 0.146 0.075 0.492 0.320
Group 2*Duopoly 0.088 0.040 -0.290 0.109
Adv0 3 0.104 0.034 0.105 0.034 0.326 0.024 0.671 0.212
Adv4 6 0.083 0.042 0.081 0.042 0.320 0.021 0.610 0.188
Adv7 13 -0.013 0.021 -0.016 0.022 0.276 0.025 0.448 0.119
Adv14 21 -0.041 0.009 -0.040 0.011 0.155 0.017 0.269 0.099
One-way 0.180 0.031 0.170 0.033 0.057 0.020 0.160 0.045
Load factor at purchase 0.136 0.021 0.148 0.022 -0.023 0.057 -0.466 0.222
Peak time 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.009 0.021 0.011 0.047 0.028
Hub for carrier 0.286 0.081 0.312 0.091
Slot-controlled airport 0.052 0.029 0.073 0.034 0.240 0.175 0.888 0.596
Southwest on route -0.282 0.137 -0.312 0.138
Low cost carrier on route 0.111 0.063 0.109 0.063 -0.146 0.067 0.112 0.227
Log distance -0.993 0.049 -1.024 0.050 -0.645 0.131 -0.018 0.367
Log total flights on route -0.299 0.109 -0.371 0.121 -0.525 0.208 1.601 1.363
Log per capita income 0.156 0.151 0.193 0.174 -0.673 0.391 0.332 0.622
Log temperature difference -0.036 0.018 -0.036 0.019 -0.053 0.033 -0.222 0.111
Tourism index -1.457 0.881 -1.369 1.080 -3.307 0.628 -4.786 3.036
Constant 9.801 1.404 10.245 1.892 18.821 5.980 -14.942 15.102
Underidentification test :
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat. 708.24 627.86 48.61 4.10
Chi-sq(1) P-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
Weak identification test :
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 126.62 266.18 4.26 2.01
# observations 128,985 128,985 94,393 94,393
R-squared 0.853 0.848 0.793 0.359
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Table 9.— Continued
US Airways Northwest
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Group F 1.414 0.240 1.143 0.065 1.144 0.260 1.072 0.073
Group 1 -0.109 0.203 0.396 0.042 0.403 0.075 0.582 0.087
Group 2 0.152 0.164 0.157 0.028 0.399 0.149 0.112 0.071
Market share -0.791 1.744 0.214 0.425 -0.126 0.749 -0.492 1.265
HHI 1.710 3.333 0.652 1.648
Monopoly -0.322 0.180 -0.036 0.094
Duopoly -0.253 0.071 -0.278 0.265
Group F*HHI -0.451 0.409 0.504 0.384
Group 1*HHI 1.116 0.259 0.689 0.116
Group 2*HHI 0.020 0.344 -0.511 0.206
Group F*Monopoly 0.067 0.083 0.376 0.213
Group F*Duopoly 0.028 0.093 0.622 0.120
Group 1*Monopoly 0.667 0.068 0.476 0.092
Group 1*Duopoly 0.094 0.047 0.308 0.198
Group 2*Monopoly -0.111 0.159 -0.306 0.095
Group 2*Duopoly 0.074 0.045 0.109 0.060
Adv0 3 -0.002 0.022 0.037 0.028 0.158 0.054 0.134 0.067
Adv4 6 0.018 0.026 0.045 0.030 0.132 0.047 0.118 0.052
Adv7 13 0.055 0.023 0.073 0.018 0.118 0.016 0.122 0.018
Adv14 21 0.030 0.026 0.054 0.009 0.090 0.016 0.098 0.013
One-way 0.113 0.020 0.130 0.015 0.113 0.021 0.111 0.018
Load factor at purchase 0.224 0.051 0.214 0.026 0.090 0.027 0.090 0.042
Peak time 0.052 0.024 0.051 0.021 0.070 0.015 0.068 0.009
Hub for carrier 0.021 0.453 0.286 0.213
Slot-controlled airport 0.280 0.269 0.367 0.125 -0.314 0.085 -0.125 0.307
Southwest on route 0.329 0.523 0.074 0.163 -0.302 0.132 -0.509 0.151
Low cost carrier on route -0.220 0.119 -0.120 0.069 -0.293 0.119 -0.323 0.056
Log distance -0.595 0.251 -0.818 0.139 -0.831 0.260 -1.232 0.537
Log total flights on route 0.118 0.307 -0.208 0.156 0.288 0.826 -0.621 1.245
Log per capita income 0.098 1.471 0.531 1.707 3.074 0.293 2.422 1.010
Log temperature difference -0.246 0.136 -0.176 0.097 0.180 0.025 0.261 0.091
Tourism index -2.813 1.157 -0.525 0.946 0.249 1.054 -1.676 1.506
Constant 4.433 19.075 3.980 16.509 -26.758 10.075 -9.651 24.184
Underidentification test :
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat. 0.72 20.46 2.37 0.86
Chi-sq(1) P-val (0.39) (0.00) (0.12) (0.35)
Weak identification test :
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat. 0.12 10.30 0.45 0.49
# observations 71,056 71,056 46,604 46,604
R-squared 0.865 0.876 0.835 0.834
Note: Fare per mile = roundtrip fare (in cents) / (2 x nonstop origin to destination mileage). White robust
standard errors reported, clustered on origin city. Market share and HHI instrumented using the same instruments as
Borenstein (1989) and Borenstein and Rose (1994). Log of total flights instrumented with the log of population. The
underidentification and weak identification tests follow Kleibergen and Paap (2006) and are heteroskedastic-robust.
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